Add blog post on cargo CVEs

posts/2022-09-14-cargo-cves.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: "Security advisories for Cargo (CVE-2022-36113, CVE-2022-36114)"
+author: The Rust Security Response WG
+---
+
+> This is a cross-post of [the official security advisory][advisory]. The
+> official advisory contains a signed version with our PGP key, as well.
+
+[advisory]: https://groups.google.com/g/rustlang-security-announcements/c/ldvsemwk_VY
+
+The Rust Security Response WG was notified that Cargo did not prevent
+extracting some malformed packages downloaded from alternate registries. An
+attacker able to upload packages to an alternate registry could fill the
+filesystem or corrupt arbitary files when Cargo downloaded the package.
+
+These issues have been assigned CVE-2022-36113 and CVE-2022-36114. The severity
+of these vulnerabilities is "low" for users of alternate registries. Users
+relying on crates.io are not affected.
+
+Note that **by design** Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build
+scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in this advisory allow
+performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your
+dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as
+it's possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural
+macros.
+
+## Arbitrary file corruption (CVE-2022-36113)
+
+After a package is downloaded, Cargo extracts its source code in the `~/.cargo`
+folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it builds. To record
+when an extraction is successfull, Cargo writes "ok" to the `.cargo-ok` file at
+the root of the extracted source code once it extracted all the files.
+
+It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages to contain a `.cargo-ok`
+*symbolic link*, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write
+"ok" into `.cargo-ok`, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the
+file the symlink pointed to with `ok`. This would allow an attacker to corrupt
+one file on the machine using Cargo to extract the package.
+
+## Disk space exaustion (CVE-2022-36114)
+
+It was discovered that Cargo did not limit the amount of data extracted from
+compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a
+specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known
+as a "zip bomb"), exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to
+download the package.
+
+## Affected versions
+
+Both vulnerabilities are present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be
+released on September 22nd, will include fixes for both of them.
+
+Since these vulnerabilities are just a more limited way to accomplish what a
+malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish
+Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files for Rust 1.63.0
+are available [in the wg-security-response repository][1] for people building
+their own toolchains.
+
+## Mitigations
+
+We recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package
+they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please
+note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows
+arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural
+macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these
+vulnerabilities.
+
+crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages
+years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these
+vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their
+dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural
+macros apply here.
+
+## Acknowledgements
+
+We want to thank Ori Hollander from JFrog Security Research for responsibly
+disclosing this to us according to the [Rust security policy][2].
+
+We also want to thank Josh Triplett for developing the fixes, Weihang Lo for
+developing the tests, and Pietro Albini for writing this advisory. The
+disclosure was coordinated by Pietro Albini and Josh Stone.
+
+[1]: https://github.com/rust-lang/wg-security-response/tree/master/patches
+[2]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security